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Why Sovereignty? What Comes After Sovereignty? 
By Oscar Guardiola-Rivera 
University of London, Birkbeck College 
 
 
Forget Sovereignty. 
 
Does sovereignty matter any more? In the days before globalisation nothing seemed 
to matter more. Back then, all sides took for granted a „Westphalian‟ framework that 
sharply distinguished between inside and outside, between a „domestic‟ and an 
„international‟ space, and sought to subsume that division within the alleged unity of 
the civilized world as fact, world-order, and historical project.  
 
The latter entailed the often unacknowledged assumption of universality and cultural 
superiority that allowed „the West‟ (an ensemble of western cultural forces, including 
particular views of law and the economy) to define the identity of others (Escobar, 
2008: 3). Within that framework, the world was seen „as a system of mutually 
recognizing sovereign territorial states‟ (Fraser, 2005: 69), production was 
concentrated on fixed spaces with conceptions of property, value and other relations 
being developed on the basis of that fixation, arguments about the justice of such 
social connections „were assumed to concern relations among fellow citizens‟ ruled 
by law (ibid.), while arguments about law presumed the „well-ordered‟ legal system 
of civilized nation-states as the standard or definitive case (Hart, 1997: 3-5).  As for 
the beyond of nation-states, the barbarous realm of strangers, it was thought to belong 
to war and to the few gentle souls that saw themselves as „the juridical consciousness 
of the civilised world‟ (Koskennniemi, 2009).  
 
Three main points characterise this account: first, in standard legal systems state 
officials represent fellow citizens, process and solve competing claims to justice. 
Second, their choices should be taken as final under the assumption that 
representation entails the transcendence of state officials in relation to the citizenry 
whose will or „spirit‟ they embody. Third, notions like „will‟ or „spirit‟ (but also 
„tradition‟ or „original intent‟, and even a pragmatic attitude) link the operation of 
state officials, and hence sovereignty, to the overarching goal of group survival and 
conflict-resolution (its management, containment, or avoidance). In this respect, 
transcendence appears, on this account, to be associated with such metaphysical terms 
as „permanence‟, „necessity‟, „presence‟, „order‟ and, in general, a certain idea of the 
invariance over time (and space) of what is and what is possible. In colloquial 
language this is expressed in the pair „law and order‟. The underlying idea, which 
stems from a deep-seated metaphysical orientation towards transcendence, seems to 
be that group survival is necessarily desirable and conflict necessarily undesirable.  
 
Transcendence is the ontological premise of Westphalian sovereignty. At first, it was 
borrowed by politics from Christian theology and embodied in various ways through 
the legitimating practices of political representation, legal integrity at home, and the 
geo-politics of Christendom abroad (Mignolo, 2000: 721-48). After secularization 
made difficult a direct appeal to such an external transcendence, politics borrowed 
from the practical ethics of passion and sentiment a new form of transcendence, this 
time internal or immanent, and yet, still married to the metaphysics of order and to the 
premise that Frantz Fanon aptly termed „the principle of exclusivity‟.1  
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In a sense, Fanon‟s conception of „the principle of exclusivity‟ is the sub-verse of the 
Benevolentist ethics of ordering through sense and sensibility (and its remnants in the 
Romantic theatre of recognition), and thus, of the civilizing impulse towards 
transcendence which informs „Westphalian‟ sovereignty as both a „theory‟ of what is 
worth counting and a „meta-theory‟ about the direction of world-history. The 
seemingly unending reciprocity of mutual visibility, gaze and feeling, passion and 
sentiment, which is said to connect a „well-ordered‟ society to the general historical 
movement of mankind (Eagleton, 2009: 15-16), is subverted by the „real‟ invisibility 
of the colonized black person -overdetermined, invisible, anonymous- inhabiting a 
zone of non-being coterminous with chaos. Crucially, as Lewis Gordon has explained 
in relation to the work of Fanon and Alfred Schutz (Gordon, 1997:  74 ff.), 
„anonymity‟ is at the heart of exchangeability, and thus, of the way of counting and 
measuring that lies at the basis of law, world-ordering, and economics today 
(statistics, standards, futures, and so on). Building upon this, it could be argued that 
mimesis, reciprocity, and recognition –the circuit of belief, credit and debt; the realm 
of reciprocal visibility and order- turns out to be utterly dependent upon a „blindspot‟: 
the place occupied by Fanon‟s colonized black person. Put otherwise, the 
overdetermination as absence of the disposable person, at one level, makes possible 
the interplay between the normal and the exceptional that makes up, at another and 
more superficial level, the internal dynamic of modern sovereignty (see Cornell, 
2008: 113-7).  
 
This point will hopefully become clearer by the end of this essay. For now, let us say 
that at least in this respect, modern sovereignty is profoundly ideological.
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 The 
premise according to which group survival is necessarily desirable and conflict 
undesirable serves as a screen that blinds us from the truth: that the security and 
survival of the group (defined in terms of reciprocal visibility and compassion, of the 
circuit of credit and debt, and thus, also, on the deferral of future events construed as 
risks or threats –the very task of the sovereign)3 depends upon the sacrifice of the 
absent person –Fanon‟s anonymous colonised black person- whose undesirable and 
unexpected return marks the end of the present order of count, some sort of final 
judgment, or the end of days. To say that modern sovereignty is ideological, because 
it is premised upon the idea that group survival is necessarily desirable and conflict 
necessarily undesirable, means that a certain configuration of power has brought 
about that some variable features of a way of life –in fact maintained only by the 
constant exercise of that power- appear to be „necessary‟, or „natural‟, and can thus be 
presented as universal (Geuss, 2008:  53). If it is the case that modern sovereignty is 
ideological because it presents some particular experience of law and politics as 
universal (in such terms as „group survival‟, „necessary sacrifices‟, „security‟ and so 
on), then analysing and criticising it is a reputable task for legal and political theory 
(Geuss, 2008: 54-5).    
 
Recent explorations of the implications of globalisation for understanding law 
acknowledge this point; they take into account what I have called, following Fanon 
and others, „overdetermination as absence‟. For instance, in his recent General 
Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective, legal theorist William 
Twining argues thus: 
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The aim of this book is to present a coherent vision of the discipline of law and of 
jurisprudence as its theoretical part in response to the challenges of globalisation. Western 
traditions of academic law have a rich heritage, but from a global perspective they appear to 
be generally parochial, narrowly focused, and unempirical, tending towards ethnocentrism. 
(Twining, 2009: xi) 
 
Twining‟s point is that „nearly all Western modern normative jurisprudence is either 
secular or explicitly Christian. Post-Enlightenment secularism has deep historical 
roots in the intellectual traditions of Western Christianity. Even those theories that 
claim universality have proceeded with only tangential reference to, and in almost 
complete ignorance of, the religious and moral beliefs, values, and traditions of the 
rest of humankind‟ (2009: 125). Let us clarify from the outset that this isn‟t a simple 
case of supplementing mainstream legal and political theory with a „multicultural‟ or 
liberal/pluralist patina, since, as Twining puts it, „when differing cultural values are 
discussed, even the agenda of issues tends to have a stereotypically Western bias‟ 
(ibid.). In fact, as we now know, that sort of pluralism „is no longer a matter of 
tolerance, but of “our right to intervention”: legal, international, and if necessary, 
military intervention‟ (Badiou, 2006: 10-11; 2005; 21). If so, if the multicultural 
supplement of „our‟ liberal attitude rapidly translates into aggressive actions that serve 
to justify „our‟ universalistic claims, then a genuine cosmopolitan general 
jurisprudence (and political theory) not only needs to do better, but actually needs to 
be overtly critical of modern and post-modern insistence upon war, borderless 
violence, and the theatrics of self-transcendence endlessly deferring the coming of the 
new.  
       
 
This paper will argue that insofar as sovereignty depends on some form of 
transcendence, external or internal, it is and has been „impotent‟ from the very outset. 
However, contrary to the idea expressed in the well-known tale about the emperor‟s 
new clothes, it is not the case that acknowledgment of this impotence brings about the 
end of sovereignty. Faced with the truth of its ultimate impotence, the sovereign 
supplements its role as decider with that of the intrigant. This new figure of 
sovereignty is embodied in the expert politician who announces the coming 
catastrophe in order to avert it or contain it through the use of „limited‟ but ultimately 
borderless violence (Gewalt).   
 
This move is imaginary, dramaturgical, or theatrical, in the sense in which in 
accordance to the legacy of Greek tragedy the action leads to catastrophe for its 
protagonists and produces catharsis in its spectators, after a phase of euphoric, 
transgressive violence. However, if in Greek tragedy this sense of the theatrical was 
associated with a conception of nature and the cosmos as harmonious, featuring 
organizing principles of their own, in the case of the modern politician the sense of 
the theatrical has become completely reflexive. Modern politicians and legislators 
behave more like extreme Nominalists, or more precisely like Benevolentists and 
Romantics, who abandon all hope in a rational or intelligible world and argue that 
thinking individuals are „the building blocks of the cosmos, their relations external‟ 
and mutually reflexive, without independent existence (just as such abstract 
conceptions as justice or the city), which come to life because we name them and set 
such names in  unending movement, in endless circularity (Douzinas, 2009: 2),  or as 
a pure thinking of the thought of the I that „leads only to eternal self-mirroring, to an 
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infinite series of mirror images that contains only the same and never anything new‟ 
(Benjamin, 1980: 35).   
 
This move leads to the denial of sociality, the radically new, and ultimately, of the 
independent existence of a common world. It entails, on the one hand, what shall be 
called later in this paper „public secrecy‟, that is, the spectacle of error and revelation 
that feed into each other in a way without end or value, and yet, turns out to be crucial 
for the making of the ultimate sovereign decision: the determination of value (in 
public). On the other hand, sovereign decision becomes formless, always expansive, 
„directed at the absolute‟ (Benjamin, 1980: 31) anchored in and supported by a 
practical network of mutual exchanges. In this sense at least, if sovereign decision 
arises out of a „fact‟ (the announced catastrophe, a future-commodity, a presence or 
an image of what must be averted, embodied perhaps in a work of art or a 
photography relayed by the media circuit, for instance), then the work or fact in turn 
depends on an idea of absolute reflection or „belief‟ that it restricts „and dissimulates 
by giving it finite shape‟ (Weber, 2008: 25). Building on this insight, it can be argued 
that the restriction is raised and the process of endless reflection reinstated, precisely, 
through the process of decision. 
 
Globalisation, Sovereignty and Value: A Materialist Amendment. 
 
Although globalization challenges forms of sovereignty more attached to the alleged 
fixity of territory and the rule of law within nation-states (and international law 
between states), it does little to undermine the sovereign decision concerning the use 
of violence and the determination of value in endless reflection. If anything, the 
opposite seems to be the case: impotent before hurricanes and tsunamis, counter-
violence in the Middle East or Latin America, and credit crises at home and 
elsewhere, the intrigant and the plotter respond with military „surges‟ that „work‟, the 
flattening of space, the governance of „disposable‟ peoples, and the economic kitchen 
sink. Another form of sovereignty seems to be born from the ashes of the old regime 
and the black letter of the law, one premised upon immanence, calculation, and the 
direction of history, with the sovereign as master of calculus and projective or 
reflective anticipation.  
 
For him (it is often a him), the verification of such catastrophic announcements and 
the „plans‟ to avert or contain them (by all means necessary) seem to take place within 
the heads of those who gather around in order to avert, contain, or defer the coming 
catastrophe, projected into the future as a possibility. The language of the new 
sovereign (it is a language) is both pragmatic and rational, but no less legalistic: it is 
the language of risk and risk-analysis and management, of facts and data mapped onto 
graphs and images, of what is worth counting, correlating, and mapping, supported by 
that cuasi-theodicy of incorporeals known as probabilistic reasoning, and a 
correspondent meta-theory of progress in linear time. By definition, crucially, that 
language seems to abhor any talk of truth or the radically new. 
 
Some representative examples of that language can be found among the 1905 US 
Supreme Court decisions Fullerton v. Texas 196 U. S. 192 (1905) and Board of Trade 
v. Christie 198 U. S. 236 (1905), and the legal doctrine that such decisions helped to 
usher in, commonly known as the doctrine of „contemplating delivery‟. As Ira Levy 
observes (2006: 307 ff.) the courts concluded that future traders could deal on 
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conceptual (or „possible‟) entities so long as they contemplated corporeal goods in 
their minds while doing so. The crucial problem was that of incorporeal exchange (of 
futures) and as Robin Blackburn has pointed out (2009: 131-2) the link between this 
purely legal doctrinal problem and the prospective standpoint developed by William 
James, O. W. Holmes, and others, can tell us much about fictions, futures, and the 
world we live in.  
 
In accordance to William James‟s pragmatic epistemology, „truth lives, for the most 
part, on a credit system (…) you accept my verification of one theory, I yours of 
another. We trade on each other‟s truth. But beliefs verified concretely by somebody 
are the posts of the whole superstructure‟ (1907: 30, cited by Blackburn, 2009: 131). 
„Truth‟ and „error‟ become in this framework a matter of shared beliefs anchored 
in/by a practical setting of exchanges, which are seemingly self-sustaining and are, for 
the most part, imaginary. Put otherwise, James‟s onto-epistemology takes the 
empiricist description of a purely relational entity without substance (mirrored, shared 
or traded sentiment and experience), fuses it with the idealist notion of self-reflexivity 
directed towards the absolute, in one and the same moment, and unilaterally elevates 
the moment of the production of truth (as belief, or co-relation between facts and the 
community that shares such facts) as a self-sustaining and seemingly unending 
process. Truth-as-credit will hold for as long as nobody refuses it, but only if we 
contemplate in our minds a future when its corporeal equivalent may be delivered. 
The latter, in turn, can be conceived as the result of the immanent (or absolute) self-
development of the former. Informed by a similar attitude, the pragmatic sovereign of 
our times deals in futures and beliefs: he „decides‟ and his decisions are supported by 
a practical setting of exchanges composed, for the most part, by the imaginary theatre 
of tele-technologies –from the stock exchange to newsrooms around the world- which 
allow us to contemplate future delivery, in our heads and on T.V. screens, as the result 
of some immanent development.  
 
The materialist amendment proposed in this paper to the James/Holmes schema of 
immanent sovereign decision points out that (1) posited in that way, as the (corporeal) 
result of the realization of the possibilities contained already in the (credit/debt-like) 
present situation, the future remains always/already possible or probable, it may or 
may not become actual, an in that sense it is quite unreal, always deferred; in short, 
we should ask: what if the future, conceived in this way, never delivers? And (2) that 
something like a corporeal entity must at some point be delivered, for we cannot 
accept that the verification process takes place entirely in the heads of those involved 
(or in the prosthetic extension of their heads into T.V. and computer screens) without 
doing away entirely with value, decision, and critique. Building upon and going 
beyond the observations made by Žižek, Blackburn and others in this respect, this 
essay proposes that it is crucial to explore (1) the centrality of tele-technologies in 
contemporary sovereignty and the determination of value, as the „concrete‟ support 
mechanism of incorporeal exchange, but also the way in which „the future‟, inscribed 
in images and circulated, mirrored, shared or traded throughout the network of tele-
technologies remains always/already „possible‟ (or deferred) rather than real, and (2) 
the libidinal economy that is attached to this pragmatic circuit of exchanges; put 
otherwise, the fictitious or theatrical character of sovereignty.
4
   
 
As Walter Benjamin observed, the role of the intrigant becomes more prominent as 
external transcendence withdraws in the wake of secularization, mechanical 
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reproduction, and „effective‟ decision. Decision as command, backed by heavenly 
presence, is replaced by decision as rule, program, and project, or „policy‟, in the 
absence of anything quite so heavenly. And although it is true that error and plotting 
have always been identified as consubstantial with politics and law, particularly by 
Platonists and other anti-democratic theorists, it is only after the fictitious character of 
sovereignty becomes firmly rooted in more earthly hopes and anticipations that 
intrigue and image (we shall say, the „imaginary‟ ethics of passion, sentiment, and 
visions of future profit/rent or common good) will become the decisive activities of 
the sovereign. 
 
Following Benjamin, on the one hand, and the results of the MCD research program,
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on the other, we can conceive this momentous transformation as more or less parallel 
to the long history of the becoming religion of capitalism and with the avatars of the 
modern/colonial world system. The crucial point is the way in which sovereignty 
becomes rooted in the earthly hopes and anticipations associated with a vision of 
future profit or rent and comes to imagine itself as self-sufficient, that is, as moved by 
purely immanent causes. Therefore, it is not the case that political sovereignty might 
have disappeared with the „death of God‟ (as both Benjamin and Carl Schmitt 
sufficiently pointed out), or that impotence puts the very notion of sovereignty into 
question. Rather, as this essay argues, we should constantly bear in mind that 
sovereign decision is determined by the double optic of projection and reception -as in 
spectator reception or „transitivity‟, but also, crucially, in consumption (Boal, 1998: 3-
5; Žižek, 2006: 50-8). If, in the first instance, the theatrics of sovereign decision and 
consumption aim at catharsis, its objective being to pacify its audiences, to tranquilize 
them, to return them to a state of equilibrium and acceptance of the situation,
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 then, in 
a second move, the materialist amendment proposed in this paper seeks, to put it in 
the terms of Augusto Boal‟s „Legislative Theatre‟, to „develop their desire for change‟ 
and to transform that desire into law, against law as the desire of the powerful (Boal, 
1998: 20).  
 
The Desire for Change v. The Desire of the Powerful: On Taking Time. 
 
The desire of the powerful is to maximize their profit. Such desire is associated with a 
certain vision of the future and rooted in hopes, forecasts, and other preventive 
anticipations. Therefore, sovereign desire has a fictitious or theatrical character, quite 
unreal but not entirely spurious. In fact, it is from the standpoint of the unreal future 
and the totalizing gaze over time considered as a whole that it allows, that all costs 
and sacrifices make sense (or become calculable). In a very precise sense, everything 
takes place as if the totality of time were accessible to the gaze of an impartial and 
benevolent theatre spectator/director. His benevolent impartiality concedes equal 
weight to anyone, for he contemplates society and history, suffering and happiness, as 
one and whole. 
 
Let there be this mise-en-scène: a totality that can be of a mathematical or logical kind 
as much as it is aesthetic, in which all elements are perfectly symmetrical, equal or 
identical. From the point of view of the totality, the only rule that justifies itself is 
impartiality in the treatment of the different elements. Thus for instance, applied to 
the value of a life considered in its totality, the rule that imposes itself would suggest 
that one cannot give to the future a superior or inferior value if and when compared to 
the present. This point has nothing to do with the absence of specific reasons that 
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might lead us to prefer this good now to the same good in the future. Rather, the point 
is that in considering only linear temporal succession, the rule that imposes itself to 
the reasonable person is that he or she should not prefer a small good today in 
comparison to a greater good tomorrow. The corollary of such rationality is that 
today‟s pleasure and happiness must be sacrificed, with reason, for the increase of 
pleasure or happiness tomorrow (Dupuy, 1992: 132 ff.; Sidgwick, 1973: 222-3). 
 
Furthermore, what applies to the well-being of an individual‟s life in its totality also 
applies to that other totality which is „the common good‟, or the well-being and 
freedom of the „Free World‟ or mankind, concepts obtained, as Dupuy points out, by 
comparison and addition of the well-being of all human beings. The self-evident 
principle of impartiality and universal (juridical) equality that is obtained through this 
procedure reads thus: from the standpoint of universality, ceteris paribus, the well-
being of an individual has no more importance than the well-being of another 
individual; in short, they are all exchangeable. And since according to reason we must 
point towards universal well-being and not towards the well-being of one of its 
elements, an axiom of abstract benevolence follows; but so does an axiom of 
sacrifice, in the same way as in the case of the individual‟s life. 
 
Thus, the standpoint of the unreal future allows for the transformation of the desire of 
the powerful into law: what has been termed before „sovereign desire‟. It makes 
exchangeability possible insofar as each and every element of the whole can be 
replaced for each another, re-presented while being made absent. This phenomenon 
was called „overdetermination as absence‟ in the first section above, in relation to the 
anonymity and invisibility of the slave and the colonized. In that context, it also 
referred to a blindspot in the anticipatory vision of capitalists and the powerful, but 
also, crucially, to a location (and a vision): the place of the exploited, the situation of 
the black colonized person, the view from below. It will suffice for the moment, to 
understand „the view from below‟ as one that instead of contemplating and 
celebrating a constellation of cultures and commodities stresses the political natures 
of tenacious inequalities and thinks through the bottom.
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 Now we also know that the 
subtraction, exclusion or sacrifice of the exploited, the anonymity and invisibility of 
the black colonized person, gives us the „minus-one‟ upon which all unanimity is 
built, and in particular, the unanimity that defines the relationship between the 
powerful (but impotent) sovereign and the people in our secular, democratic times. 
 
As Rousseau recognized long ago, in the chapter „Des Suffrages‟ of his Du Contrat 
Social, Book IV, unanimity designates the ambivalent point where the consensus of 
deliberative assemblies signals the dominance of the General Will, but also, the 
decline of the state. „At the other extremity of the circle‟, he wrote, „unanimity recurs; 
this is the case when the citizens, having fallen into servitude, have lost both liberty 
and will. Fear and flattery then change votes into acclamation; deliberation ceases, 
and only worship or malediction is left‟ (Rousseau, 1968: IV, 2). Rousseau is 
referring to common (nearly unanimous) hatred and violence, internal to the group, 
being harnessed and channelled outwards, against the anonymous „minus-one‟, 
thereby providing both the imaginary foundation of the unity of the demos and its 
practical, or shall we say Real (in the psychoanalytic sense) anchor in the form of 
conflict-management and the outward turn of civil war. 
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Implicit in such a reference is a determination of „the political‟ as the successful 
containment of a group‟s aggression, and of „the legal‟ as the ordering of/against 
conflict in lieu of the necessity of group survival. As Brazilian playwright Augusto 
Boal has observed this was precisely the point of Greek tragedy (1998: 20); the 
circular recurrence of moments of transgressive violence followed by catharsis point 
towards a staging of time as the eternal repetition of the same in the exceptional and 
the cathartic unity of the people, a mise-en-scène made possible by the sacrificial 
subtraction of the „minus-one‟ people. This manner of speaking is appropriate since in 
fact the sacrificially excluded is so radically other that it is as if it did not count, and 
retroactively, were never worth counting from the perspective of the well-ordered 
community. In this sense, Rousseau correctly refers to the peculiar coincidence of the 
greatest dominance of the General Will and the decline of the state as a circular 
recurrence, an imaginary arresting of time subtended by the harnessing of destructive 
energies focused upon a sacrificial scapegoat. Today, however, this homo sacer is 
reintegrated rather than excluded, not to the community strictly speaking, since in 
abstract (juridical) terms she is no more an „other‟ but fundamentally equal, but 
rather, to its way of counting: her disgrace becomes the basis for the deduction of the 
common good. It is because she is anonymous and exchangeable, a replaceable 
element of the social whole, that she can be disposed of in the name of the necessity 
of the group‟s survival or the common good to come, that is, to the whole, all the 
while her fundamental human right to equality remains intact (Dupuy, 1982: 137; 
Kirwan. 2008: 21-2). In short, sovereign desire, and the total gaze it projects upon the 
future, has the production and governance of „disposable‟ peoples as its task and 
object.
8
 
 
The proposition is that in today‟s world, a stage set up in accordance to the law of 
general equivalence, so-called „disposable‟ peoples (bodies) are the object of 
(sovereign) desire. This means (1) that sovereign power aims to turn peoples into 
meritorious bodies, i. e.objects qualified for universal traffic and self-reliance 
(meaning the ability to place themselves on the market at the best price); (2) that it 
must protect and insure (asegurar, in Spanish) such meritorious bodies (at risk) 
against the conjoined threats of  exposed/marked bodies (the infamous „hooded 
youth‟) and, strictly speaking, sacrificed/martyred bodies (the terrorist/martyr in the 
Islamic world, the US or Europe, the human rights activist/terrorist in such places as 
Colombia), both of them taken as risks themselves, counted as such, and submitted to 
the rule of the police and the military; (3) that the power with which the sovereign 
seeks to realize its desire (to govern the world of peoples) is not its own but belongs 
to another: the sovereign is impotent in the sense that the law is exterior to him and 
cannot be identified with a symbolic paternal figure or his excessive enjoyment (for it 
is the law of the marketplace); (4) that, in a similar sense, the sovereign is not the 
authoritarian paternal figure but its semblance, in the sense that (4.1.) it dreams of the 
mastery of the body of the „disposable‟ person, (4.2.) in that sense the sovereign-
master is a dream (of the slave-disposable body) and (4.3) then its claim to knowledge 
(the purported mastery of the sovereign over the anticipated future, his turn as 
intrigant and risk-manager) is false, for he knows nothing, he‟s an idiot; (5) put 
otherwise, the body of the sovereign is a spectral symbol of the decay of the state 
rather than of its strength -mirrored by the anonymous bodies of its „disposable‟ 
peoples, marked and distributed under the sign of at risk/ risks themselves and/or 
utility maximizers; (6) If so –if the relation of the sovereign and its desired peoples is 
but a symptom of state decay vis-à-vis the „bad choice‟ of fictitious value and the 
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unreal future- then the „good choice‟ is between two forms of real decay: nihilist (total 
war with no end and no value) or  organized, disciplined around an anticipatory vision 
that, starting from below, is projected into a virtual but nonetheless real future that 
becomes powerful on its own right, as having the allure of the unexpected (Guardiola-
Rivera, 2009: 236-242).
9
   
 
Put otherwise, this is to say that the semblances of the intrigant, the assumptions that 
we are all utility maximizers, and we can be no toher way in this world, or we are all 
risk managers, and therefore incapable of anything like true discipline and courage, 
these masks, should be seen for what they are: „myths propping up what we are fated 
to be in this unjust world‟.10 However disposable, masked, invisible, and anonymous, 
it is crucial to understand that these peoples do not lack vision. Because of this, as in a 
counterpoint, we shall imaginatively enhance
11
 and oppose this view from below –
and the radical politics of anticipatory projection it founds-
12
 to the timeless, 
preventive-anticipatory vision and desire of the powerful. The point is that the view 
from below, and the political organization it founds is not timeless; it takes time. But, 
in accordance to our materialist amendment, so does a political decision. The time 
expended upon the production of a specific policy is not valorized as „socially useful‟ 
until it is effectively „sold‟ to the people, the electorate, or, in an increasingly global 
environment, the peoples of the world. This is to say that the „confirmation‟ of a 
rule/policy decision has nothing to do with whether it actually works or not, whether 
it is correct or erroneous, whether it achieves its self-posited aims or not; this is only a 
part, in any case a minimal part, of what can be called the verification-process of 
sovereign decision. Rather, the moment of verification of a specific policy or a set of 
policies is election time, poll time, referendum time, T.V. time before the electorate 
and global viewers, that is, the moment when people‟s sentiment and sensibility can 
be checked, by whatever means necessary. 
 
 To acknowledge this, we are required not to imagine the point of production of 
policies and rules (sovereignty and the sovereign) as some self-sufficient, timeless 
realm. The point is also to emphasize that the formation of a bond between the 
sovereign and the people, let us call it „political subjectification‟, i. e. the formation of 
the political bond as a species of desire, whether democratic or authoritarian, in which 
the people find some form of unity in the figure of the sovereign, takes time and that 
some political agents (the politicians) seek to anticipate the results. We have 
suggested that this anticipatory knowledge is quite unreal and can be opposed by the 
political organization of the people gathered around the view from below, and 
disciplined towards the alluring unexpected and the radically new (Guardiola-Rivera, 
2009: 254-6).  
 
Thus, sovereign (libidinal) investment has a necessarily fictitious character, associated 
with forecasts and preventive anticipations. It is ridden by the dream of the mastery of 
the (slave) body at risk/a risk itself, revealed impotent by the externality of the means 
at its disposal (the law of the marketplace, the always mercenary army and police), 
and rendered idiotic (catastrophically idiotic, leading to endless and valueless war) by 
its own attempts to map out and survey the future.  This relation between political 
sovereignty and the projective legality of the marketplace may not be merely 
analogical: insofar as capitalism replaces (and displaces) religion, the only sovereign 
decision that counts is the determination of value; and as we know very well, value 
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has a futural dimension. It is no more than „the discounted present value of future 
profits‟ (Blackburn, 2008: 129). 
 
This is to say that the libidinal economy of sovereign decision is not alien to the profit 
and rent economy of capital. This was already apparent in the days of 
mercantilism/coloniality and it has become increasingly clear during the process of 
consolidation of global finance capitalism. Since the latter –capitalist profit-rent 
economy- has traditionally received the almost exclusive attention of theorists and 
social scientists, let us call for a more concentrated focus on the libidinal economy of 
sovereign decision. Not only because it is a worthy subject of study on its own right, 
but also because there seems to be a link between the global expansion of capitalism 
as such and a specific political dimension, in need of further clarification. In short, the 
point is that the territorial reach of capitalism, its becoming global, has ultimately 
depended on a political dimension of sacrifice and war (Arrighi, 2007: 211-274; 
Maldonado-Torres, 2008: 2-19).   
  
Sacrifice and War: On Legislative Theatre. 
 
The logic of political reproduction and expansion, just as the logic of capitalist 
investment, depends on a vision of future profit –or some other maximizing function 
such as the common good, the interests and sensibilities of civilized nations, the 
happiness of society or mankind- in which gains outweigh losses and „necessary‟ 
sacrifices at some ultimate point in finite time. From the perspective of such an 
ultimate point in time, every specific element can be seen as an element of the whole, 
a part of it that is equal to any other part within the whole. To this abstract and 
universal equality (juridical equality, human rights, democracy, and so on) 
corresponds the exchangeability of peoples, their anonymous and „disposable‟ 
character. The narrative that expresses this logic speaks of necessary costs and 
sacrifices in the name of some maximizing function defined by state officials attentive 
to the exterior but immanent law of the marketplace and duped by a sense of history. 
This does not imply that citizens –and in this framework the discussion always 
pertains to citizens, and soldiers- obey or follow the choices made by state officials 
out of habit, since it could be said that citizens display a „critical reflective attitude‟ 
towards the law (Hart, 1997: 57 ff.).  
 
In the more refined and liberal forms of such account, the point is to take as a given 
that once citizens choose their representatives in one way or another, hopefully by 
electoral vote (although forms of choice other than electoral vote might be acceptable, 
as Rawls suggests in The Law of Peoples), in accordance to the rules established in 
written or non-written national constitutions, the former could not or should not 
reasonably process their claims to justice in any other way than that determined by 
such rules and the established frame of representation, incarnated in the 
representatives. Put otherwise, the aim is to maintain consistency with a constitutional 
a priori that consists of a definitive set of self-evident maxims that impose themselves 
to each and every reasonable person, and which could be described either as an initial 
democratic will, the spirit of constitutional (written or unwritten) origins, or in any 
case, the ultimate set of our most fundamental moral intuitions.  
 
Here, it is important not to forget two things: first, whatever their differences, most 
„Westphalian‟ accounts –from Hart to Rawls, but also those developed by Jürgen 
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Habermas in the „global North‟ or Enrique Dussel in the „global South‟- commonly 
accept the idea that to think politics and law is to think about our most basic 
normative intuitions. Against this injunction to forget sovereignty by focusing on 
some fundamentally self-evident „applied ethics‟, one must firmly establish and 
maintain an opposite injunction: that we remember sovereignty by focusing on power 
–the very important question of war and sacrifice, i. e. on the limited function of the 
state in relationship to what it distinguishes as civil society; then contextualize it by 
focusing on the often impotent history of power (its becoming a never-fulfilled 
promise, the fact that the state today has no means, that „it cannot do everything‟ as 
politicians say), and then, in a third movement, de-contextualize it by focusing on the 
way in which demands for „sovereignty‟, „development‟, „justice‟ and so on are often 
not so much about justice and development per se, as if the state could do everything, 
but rather, „a subversive appropriation of a never-fulfilled promise‟, geared towards 
the truth of sociality and the common, in the terms used by the anthropologist and 
social movements‟ theorist Arturo Escobar (2008: 176).  
 
This means two things: Firstly, that such „local talk‟ about justice is not so much 
about justice per se (our innermost basic normative intuitions imposed upon the state 
as normative ideals to be weighed against „practice‟) as it is about a situated history 
and culture, a vision and a choice,
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 more specifically the view from the position of 
the so-called „disposable‟ peoples of the world „within the modern colonial world 
system‟ (Escobar, 2008: 176-177) or peoples in need of governance (aid and police). 
From that standpoint, which we have called before „the view from below‟, the site of 
power appears empty: hegemony has unravelled in the international context (Arrighi, 
2007: 175-276) while at home power is camouflaged and anarchical (Taussig). The 
field appears open and a choice is called for: either the return of ancient law (the 
return of the sacrificial racialized body, the service of the good, war and sacrifice) or 
the coming of a new law, the transformation of the desire and the vision from below 
into law, the disciplined organization of the collective, as suggested by the case of 
Augusto Boal‟s „Legislative Theatre‟ (1998: 19-23). Second, rather than being based 
upon self-evident maxims or conformity with the group‟s consensus, the question of 
power and sovereignty must be answered from a more realist, perhaps even 
materialist standpoint. To put it in terms of the materialist examination of sovereign 
decision and value, we must insist that verification cannot take place entirely within 
the heads of different types of traders, the military, humanitarians and the politicians, 
nor it can be left to the global hegemony of their „common language‟ (Kennedy, 
2004: 277). At some point dignity, freedom from poverty, and justice must cease to be 
a target or a promise, become the genuine article and find a purchaser. 
 
In that sense, the challenge for „post-Westphalian‟ accounts of law and politics is to 
account for „situated talk‟ about justice, development, sovereignty, and so on, as part 
and parcel of the political (as political activity, conflict and struggle) rather than in 
terms of an appeal to the given set of our ultimate ethical intuitions, geared towards 
the necessary desirability of group survival and conflict-resolution. To put it 
otherwise, if it is true that viewed from below the tragedy of sovereignty has also been 
revealed as comedy –as public secrecy and anarchical division, as baroque drama and 
soap-opera- then something like Boal‟s „legislative theatre‟ must take place. Its 
premise is simple: there is no choice between different forms of pragmatism 
submitted to the law of the marketplace. The market judges according to the criteria 
of what is available, „it sees the new with the same tired eyes it saw the old. And it 
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does not understand. It misunderstands‟ (Boal, 1998: 183). Hence, what is required is 
a form of politics which is transitive, not only in the sense that it proposes interaction, 
change, and the improbable assembly of subjects from all over, rather than benevolent 
empathy, the delegation of our ability to act, and the object-subject relationship 
between meritorious bodies and the body of the sovereign as protector (Boal, 2008: 
84), but also, in the sense of its commitment to the truth of sociality and the common.  
 
At stake are understanding and hope for a redeemed world beyond what is available 
(Boal, 1998: 183) but also the opening up of options that were never before available: 
the opening up of a space, real and imaginary, and a position (Cornell, 2008: 123, 
128). Understood in this sense, truth and hope are not incompatible with „good 
empathy‟, and thus with the projective and reflective capacities of beings human and 
non-human. Let us call this „vicarious communication‟, or „aesthetics‟ for short. From 
the perspective of this aesthetics it is no coincidence that „history‟ is best told in 
images, as Benjamin might have put it. 
 
Drucilla Cornell explains this Benjaminian insight via a photograph taken during the 
Soweto uprising in which a young man and a young woman carrying the dying body 
of Hector Petersen. From the standpoint of those who had to endure apartheid such a 
lived brutality could be nothing other than senseless suffering. As Benjamin put it, „a 
dialectical image flashes up at a moment of danger‟ (Benjamin, 1968:255, cited by 
Cornell, 2008:139) but it also illuminates a beyond in which we hear the call to justice 
of those young men and women who had the courage „to shout out at their oppressors 
what their humanity demanded: Justice! Nothing more and nothing less‟ (ibid.). The 
call that Cornell talks about is strictly speaking an „enunciation without statement‟, a 
voice split from its quality; this notion conveys the idea of law‟s inherent otherness or 
necessary contingency, and therefore, permits a distinction between an excessive 
dimension without meaning (which both Benjamin and Cornell locate temporally and 
spatially as „beyond‟, a position and a momentary glimpse of the future) that compels 
us to take a stance, to act and provide new meaning out of nothing, and the positing of 
fully meaningful commands that exclude our engagement and appear as the static 
meta-level that supports our more or less blind, idiotic, actions.
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The latter describes normative commands issued by a sovereign that seeks to 
interpellate us –the intrigant- and to whom we delegate our power. The former 
describes a voice and nothing more, but also nothing less! The space marked by these 
different but related modalities of voice and sound   entails the possibility to refrain 
from following a straight line by randomly rearranging the constituent elements (in a 
text, an image, and so on) or providing an unexpected meaning or content to a call out 
of nothing. This is also the power of a dialectical image such as that described by 
Benjamin and Cornell, or the cut-up practice in art. All of them refer to choice and 
responsibility in a more radical way, by placing them in the virtual but real domain of 
true anticipation against the availability of the possible and the analysis of risk.
15
 
 
„But we do not see a “risk manager” in this photograph‟, says Cornell in relation to 
the Soweto image. She means that we see a boy and a girl who, even in their terror, 
show to us in their act of refusing to abandon Hector Petersen the depths of a 
humanity that would not bow down before the bullets and simply free. This is, she 
would say, a moral image of freedom. „They will never be gone to history, in 
Benjamin‟s sense, if we remember them. But, we can only remember them if we 
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allow ourselves to see them. It is up to us to do it‟ (Cornell, 2008: 140). In a sense, the 
theatre of risk and sovereignty –of „public secrecy‟- counts on our distraction with the 
spectacle of distant suffering, our empathy. Can we tease out of that scenario „good 
empathy‟ and „virtual anticipation‟ as a method for political organization and radical 
choice?       
 
Experience: the Intrigant. 
 
As the previous question suggests, Boal‟s experience of „legislative theatre‟ is not 
altogether different from a Benjaminian notion of passageway and his use of the term 
Erfahrung.   The point is that although we are critical of the theatrics of the intrigant, 
of myth, when it temporalizes the self as „inevitably teaching a lesson that things will 
always be as they are now, this rebellion against historical compulsion still seeks to 
keep alive a horizon that does not relinquish the potential of myth to point to a 
different form of knowledge of the world around us‟ (Cornell, 2008: 140). This is the 
Benjaminian passageway that brakes apart myth by its own means and teases from 
within it a virtual (rather than merely possible) „redeemed world‟ in spite of our 
nightmarish surroundings (ibid.). This is also the point of Boal‟s legislative theatre: to 
maintain fidelity before the threshold of another world (very different from fidelity to 
a dogmatic truth). In both cases the re-definition of sovereignty as „public secrecy‟ is 
taken into account. But the ultimate point is to show that the passageway is open 
before us if we make the „good choice‟ away from nihilism and move through 
mythical constraints with discipline and fidelity so as to find the future „under the 
ultimate truth of advanced capitalism, claiming that there is no truly different future 
but only the forever new that displaces one commodity for another commodity that is 
new only insofar as it is the same: a commodity‟ (Cornell, 2008: 141).   
 
This is a very important suggestion, since it entails something about the connection 
between place and polity: that a certain kind of space, some sort of endless field 
associated with the effectiveness of planetary technology, world capitalism, and a 
legal system subservient to unfettered, self-revolutionising production, is under 
construction. This would be in the words of one of its architects, Milton Friedmann, a 
„flattened world‟ or a system with no end and no value.16 If war returns in such a 
value-less, pragmatic, materialist scenario, as the very activity of flattening the space 
or eliminating all obstacles, and in that precise sense, as the return of sovereignty, 
then such „sovereignty‟ would be one devoid of its ability to determine end and value 
in its very claim to be able to do so. It is a bit like British PM Gordon Brown flying 
around trying to save the (capitalist) world from itself, all the while it becomes 
increasingly clear that redemption is not near. If everything, to judge from the 
headlines in the British newspapers on the eve of the protests against the G20 summit, 
it is the end, revolution, what seems nearer. 
 
Thus, we are confronted by a paradoxical sovereignty, insofar as the very notion has 
been associated with the ontological question of determination qua definitive act. As 
we have seen before, „sovereign‟ is in the Westphalian frame the one who has the 
power to determine, to make the distinction, to establish or decide the end and the 
exception. However, in the new scenario of instability and „endless war‟ this very 
power not only becomes questionable, but it‟s clearly not there. This is the comedy of 
power, as it‟s been nicely called, or rather, it‟s soap-operatic version, with the 
intrigant as Protagonist. Michael Taussing speaks of „public secrecy‟.  
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To repeat: in a value-less or „flattened‟ world that leaves no place for heterogeneity 
the radical suspension of its „endemic and perennial interruptions‟ becomes more and 
more difficult. Hence, the Sovereign finds himself in a situation „in which decision is 
as imperative as it is impossible‟ (Weber, 2008: 188). The result is the incapacity of 
the tyrant to decide. As Benjamin put it, „the Prince, in whose hands the decision on 
the state of exception reposes, shows himself at the earliest opportunity to be unequal 
to his task: a decision is practically impossible for him (…) He falls victim to the 
disproportion between the unlimited hierarchical dignity, with which he is divinely 
invested and the humble estate of his humanity‟ (Benjamin, 1998: 70-71).  
 
Endless war is in this respect nothing else but the mirror-image of a system with no 
other end than endless aggrandisement and no other value than impotent credit-as-
value. This is why war is carried out nowadays in the name of humanity, postulated as 
the highest, and, yet, unachievable value. As explained before, humanity, like rights 
and so on, carries no intrinsic value and only borrows one from the future. 
„Humanity‟, thus understood, is itself no more than the discounted present value of 
future rent.  The connection with a capitalism that has moved from profit to rent at a 
global scale, is that humanity (this time „the common world of humanity‟) is the 
object of expropriation. We now know this to be strictly true: the cost of the present 
bail-outs to save the bankrupt banking system will be born by generation after 
generation. Their time has been expropriated and expended already. The result is time 
and space posited as if they were an endless field, always relativised, or more 
precisely, one in which the end is always in state of deferral.  
 
The subject who pretends to rule over such a space is also infinitely split, a sovereign 
divided into an ultimately ineffective if bloody tyrant, a no less ineffective martyr, a 
bad joker, and all the variations in between (Weber, 2008: 189). This sovereign rules 
over a system of wills that represent concretely, individually, the justifiable ethical 
values (the available options) and which come into conflict because one of the 
characters possesses a tragic flaw or commits a dramatic error (as is the case of 
politicians, for instance King Lear dividing his kingdom). After the catastrophe, when 
the flaw is purged, equilibrium is restored necessarily. In the soap-operatic variation 
there‟s no need for the actual catastrophe to take place. It is sufficient that the 
politician announces it as a possibility in order to avert it. His failure will be purged 
by the revelation of the error and the acknowledgment that, nevertheless, the 
occurrence of the announced catastrophe remains a possibility. Then, equilibrium is 
restored. The sovereign presents himself as tyrant and martyr. The claim is that there 
is no truly different future but only the forever new that displaces one promise of 
good or catastrophe for another that is new only insofar as it is the same: an option.    
 
As Weber puts it (ibid.) the effect of this bad infinity, this disproportion, „does not 
come to rest at any of the compromises possible between these two poles [tyrant and 
martyr]‟. This means, firstly, that in terms of the appearance of the sovereign in this 
new situation, in a public sphere dominated by the spectacle of the media, the tragedy 
of politics is superseded by the drama of political action and its soap-operatic version, 
as Benjamin more or less predicted. Secondly, in this new scenario the character of 
the sovereign appears as the epitome of stoic ostentation: immensely powerful yet 
impotent, omnipresent and yet unplaceable, overconfident and yet falling pray to 
unchecked affects and emotions, exceptional, and yet just one of us.  
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And yet, what characterizes the passage from the Westphalian frame of external 
transcendence to immanent spectacle, from the tragedy that ends up in the final 
showdown between the tyrant and the martyr (or its resolution in front of a panel of 
judges) to the drama of political soap-opera is the emergence of a third figure that 
accompanies the splitting of the sovereign and stands in radical dissymmetry to the 
other two (Weber, 2008; 189-191). This third figure, displaced or unplaceable, is the 
bad joker, the plotter, the intrigant. 
 
„To understand what distinguishes the plotter from the two other figures in the 
baroque political triad, it must be understood that the incapacity of the sovereign to 
decide involves the transformation not merely of an individual character-type, but also 
the manner in which history itself is represented (…) And this in turn determines the 
way in which representation takes place. With the split of the sovereign into tyrant 
and martyr, what is dislocated is not just the unity of a character, but the unity of 
character as such‟ (ibid.). Put otherwise, if the political is the plane of representation 
in which decision-making rules are established and the procedures for staging and 
resolving contests in the economic and cultural dimension are set, as Fraser argues 
(2005: 75) then the dislocation of the unity of character as such entails the 
disaggregation of the political and of representation as such. The discontinuous 
temporality of exception, before associated with the other-wordly space of tragedy, is 
replaced now „within a spatial continuum in which exceptional interruptions are no 
longer possible because they have become the rule. The regular nature of the 
interruption paradoxically becomes programmable and the programmer (…) is the 
intriguer‟ (Weber, 2008: 191). Put otherwise, sovereign power is anarchical and 
divided against itself. This is the spectacle that produces, in effect, liberal power, 
since one must have at least two sides in order for it to work. This is true, also, of the 
anti-liberal version of sovereignty made up by Schmitt: one must have at least 
„friends‟ and „enemies‟ for it to work; „which is to say that it doesn‟t work, and so the 
division of power is exhibited‟ (Miller, 2008: 44). In any case, we have a power that 
is not one, of which the frictions, the dysfunctions, the gaffes and the affairs (better 
yet if they are of a sexual nature) „make up the daily accounting that feeds us‟ (ibid.). 
And there you have it, public secrecy, the comedy of sovereignty. 
 
If this is the case then, contrary to Fraser‟s intuitions (2005: 73-75), not only there is 
no unity of the political as such, but also, it is the case that the boundary-setting aspect 
and the procedure-setting aspect of the political become a matter of what could be 
termed „organized entanglement‟ (Weber, 2008: 191), „public secrecy‟ (Taussig, 
2003: 457) or more simply soap-opera. Put simply, the role of the sovereign in the 
immanent (catastrophic) situation is to manage public secrecy and to create apparently 
lawless, in fact hyper-legislated, spaces such as Guantánamo or the Diego García 
Island, and to call for re-regulation of the market-space that he himself emptied. This 
is a play of the eternal, circular recurrence of the dream of terra nullius and anima 
nullius, the anonymity of the black colonised person.   
 
Representing citizenry, a task that nowadays overflows the boundaries of one‟s 
nation-state, has thus become equivalent to the establishment of boundaries and 
procedures condensed into the formula „knowing what not to know‟ (ibid.). In other 
words, the mastery of the plotter (which has replaced the absolute sovereignty of the 
tyrant) is to use revelation so as to conceal further, to con-found and confuse. This 
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makes the question of truth and justice in the political realm all the more complicated, 
and, yet, it is precisely to the question of truth that we must attend. 
 
True Experience: The Joker. 
 
Perhaps the political division that matters nowadays is that between those who know 
and those who know what not to know.  Those who are „in the know‟ are the rulers, 
who administer knowledge (from intelligence and torture to statistics and economic 
graphs). If one must distinguish this knowledge, let us add now the interplay between 
error and truth, and put it on the side of administration of knowledge, one must say 
„debility of truth‟ (Miller, 2008: 44). And as he (and Lacan) would say: we are now at 
the heart of the subject; „the truth that speaks (…) but which does not speak the truth‟ 
(ibid.). The truth is in speech, but it is in speech to be deciphered, and this means 
exactly that it can only disclose itself and rejoin power in the form of a lie. Around 
every truth that pretends to speak as such, around every truth that is not half-speak, 
but which pretends to speak by telling (the whole) truth, or, this is the same, the truth 
of the whole, „a clergyman who is an obligatory liar prospers‟ (Miller, 2008: 45, 
citing Lacan, 2006: 173). 
 
Crucially, at this point, Lacan introduces „the weak of spirit‟, the mentally deficient. 
They are not „at the level of power‟, they remain „in a very singular relationship with 
truth which does not join up with power‟, there is, so to speak, „a complicity of the 
weak of spirit with truth‟ (ibid.). To me, this is the point where Fanon, the analyst, 
takes over and continues where Lacan left. For who were Fanon‟s patients in the 
Caribbean and in Algeria, if not the „mentally defficient‟ colonised person as she 
undergoes the denial of her sociality on a day-to-day basis? It is not the case that she 
has some privileged access to truth, but rather, as it occurs in Liberation Theology 
with the poor, that „truth has much more affinity with debility and weakness than with 
power‟ (ibid.). The point of this riddles is that, in contrast to the sovereign who wants 
to purge society of its obstacles in order to bring back peace and equilibrium, the poor 
and the colonised purge themselves of non-action.    
 
Those who „know what not to know‟ are at least decent, while the rest of us, who 
complaint about being deemed ignorant or made into ignoramuses who must trust 
those „supposed to know‟, become ungovernable and, potentially, the enemy. If on the 
one hand our lack of knowledge prevented us from acting on behalf of a good cause, 
so that we desired neutrality and abstinence, as Boal says (2008: 87), on the other 
hand,  the purge of non-action passes through camouflage and seeks a „true dream‟. 
This is the point of Benjamin‟s passageway and Wahrtraum, and of Boal‟s „Joker‟. 
Let us then oppose the weakness of spirit of the Joker –who knows what not to know, 
or knows that the truth can only be half-said- to the camouflaged power of the 
Intrigant –who knows and functions within the remit of the churches which preserve 
the truth, but which lie and misrepresent since they pretend to tell the whole truth. 
 
It is not the case that misrepresentation occurs solely when political boundaries or 
procedures deny some people, wrongly, the possibility of participating/representing 
on a par with others in social interaction (Fraser, 2005: 76), since, in fact, in the new 
political scenario nobody is denied such a possibility, or, to be more precise, 
everybody, men and women, white, brown, yellow or black, are invited to participate 
in the abstract, or remain always potentially included in the system of 
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participation/representation. The all-inclusiveness of the post-sovereign scenario is 
condensed in the formula „everyone can see it, but nobody can say it‟, or in the axiom 
of universal juridical equality in which „everyone‟s view is exchangeable for 
everyone‟s alternative view‟. Put otherwise, everyone is displaced since every place is 
potentially exchangeable: we are left with a given set of options and a given set of 
positions. The injunction is to enjoy (and join in) the „emotional orgy‟ of position-less 
option tasting. 
 
This is also why nowadays resistance and rebellion tends to be positioned. The „Joker‟ 
system in Boal‟s legislative theatre works through camouflage by establishing herself 
as a neighbour and contemporary of the spectator (Boal, 2008: 152). Rather than 
engaging on explanations (the management of knowledge) she is removed from the 
other characters in order to bring her closer to the spectators. She is not a 
representative of „humanity‟ or this or that „value‟, but rather, a position. A position 
suggests that we are indeed within a density of determination (hierarchies throughout 
advanced capitalist and racist society) but, crucially, that we can enhance the sphere 
of options by posing (imaginatively, in projective relation with the real future and 
with the counterfactual consequences of our actions) ways of presenting ourselves in 
the world not yet marred by the hierarchies that „ensnare us as sunk into a density of 
determination that we cannot seemingly escape‟ (Cornell, 2008: 131). Lewis Gordon 
speaks of „incantative forces; that „need to be renewed and expanded in our 
humanistic search for our humanity‟ (2000: 179). Thus, the position of the Joker is 
that of the „true dream‟ in Benjaminian parlance, true to what humanity can be when 
it is salvaged from the sameness of advanced capitalism. Similarly, rebellion today 
occurs through the renewal of incantative forces, not in the name of nation or 
humanity, but rather, as in the case of Bolivia, in the name of blacks, indigenous and 
peasants, who do not count as human, cannot have a place, or are construed and 
named as a residue and a remainder, but remain true to what humanity can be. To 
sociality and the common.  
 
More controversial and more ominous is the case of the November attacks in India: 
the perpetrators are nameless, their demands unknown or non-existent, their place of 
origin undetermined, loosely linked to Kashmir but also potentially British, or in any 
case connected to the history of British colonialism. Interestingly enough, as soon as 
there was a suggestion of the Britishness of the terrorists, the British government 
moved to deny the place-ness and nature of these people. They remain to this day, for 
all intents and purposes, inhuman. 
 
One should resist the temptation to put cases such as Bolivia and India in the same 
sack: the anti-modern and the inhuman. Careful attention to difference and detail is 
required. Common branding might serve the interests of those who seek to gather all 
enemies together in order to get rid of them once and for all. And yet, the one thing 
that subtends all of these cases is the liminality of the places or non-places where we 
seek to locate them. They are at the threshold. If this is the case, yet another 
connection with the old Aristotelian tradition (the link between tragedy, place and 
human nature) surfaces: that which places certain peoples in Utopia, meaning both 
„there is no such place‟ and „there is no such man‟; neither an Edenic creature nor the 
vision of the nightmarish Cannibal.
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Resistance and rebellion, in the form of pure violence, violence without means, as 
opposed to the violence without end of the state and the dominant power without 
hegemony, is also carried out nowadays by the named and discounted themselves. In 
this sense, to go back to the Bolivian case, the triumph of MAS-IPSP (Marcha al 
Socialismo –Instrumento Politico por la Soberania de los Pueblos) is a shattering 
event. It reminds us that we do not have to wait for that truth because, as Cornell says 
also in respect of South Africa, „we have already glimpsed what it means to be a true 
human being‟ (Cornell, 2008: 141). The Bolivian event disrupts the flatness and 
smoothness of the endless space that characterises the emerging sovereignty of faux 
empire and intrigant sovereignty, based on infinite relativism and the invocation of 
the name „humanity‟. It ushers in a more relevant, determinate infinity. To the 
conception of deferred time (the time of exception, to which it corresponds a politics 
of prevention, decontamination and elimination) that dominates the reconstruction of 
faux imperial sovereignty under way, the indigenous and peasants of Bolivia have 
opposed a situated struggle, in geopolitical (liminal) space, for auto-transcendence in 
time. The meaning of this „auto-transcendence‟ is that of the Benjaminian „tireless 
leap of action‟ , the being-together in action that marks true experience in Benjamin‟s 
sense of the word Erfahrung (2004: 1-5). His point is that any attempt to fully 
describe experience –the purported knowledge of the sovereign- is doomed to fail 
because it always points beyond itself to its own limit and to how that limit opens up 
the space, the position and the vision of the beyond. 
 
If for the first conception, that of the intrigant, time and the future remain always a set 
of given and non-actualized options or possibilities, and therefore always open-ended, 
for the second, that of the rebellious joker, the future, in contrast, is real and therefore 
a matter of closure. As a result, in the second case politics is not about prevention, but 
rather, about prediction. The joker is a magical reality; „he creates it‟ (Boal, 2008: 
159). The term „sovereignty of peoples‟ which appears in the name of the Bolivian 
movement, is precisely a reference to the power of the elements of a collective to 
project themselves into the future and, from that vantage point, look at the past and 
give it determinate form.  
 
This is a form of self-determination that has nothing to do with the de-materialization 
of the objects of the world or the limits of human knowledge that characterises the 
critical space of modernity. And in that specific sense, it is an instance of politics 
beyond critique. It refers not to subjective uncertainty, as is the case with the politics 
of prevention and elimination that aims at the establishment and continuous redrawing 
of limits and the announcement of catastrophes for the purposes of averting their 
occurrence. Rather, its point of reference is objective uncertainty and complexity. It 
acknowledges that to deal with objective uncertainty is not a matter of subjective 
belief or faith, and/ or the capacity to survey, from an ultimately theological sovereign 
point of view, the given set of all possible cases or options and choose the one that 
maximises some relative principle (perfection, enjoyment, efficacy). Uncertainty and 
complexity call for the capacity to project „fixed points‟ in the future, predictions, 
speculative visions of hope or catastrophe, and reduce them to practice. 
  
Indigenous people in struggle in Bolivia call this „the internal way‟. Boal speaks of 
the joker as a magical reality. Gordon refers to the renewal of incantative forces, and 
Benjamin talks about the true dream. We tend to believe that this sort of power is 
archaic, a superstitious thing of the past, as it would be expected from indigenous 
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practices or Latin American fancies. That would be a mistake: first, given that the 
objects that are most common in our post-modern life, from nanotechnology and 
climate change to the car-bomb and financial instruments, feature increasing levels of 
complexity, the collective power to predict the future and make it happen is actually 
the most relevant form of action in our time.
18
 Second, evidence of the recognition 
and use of this sort of power may be found in non-indigenous, post-colonial and 
enlightened situations. A crucial one, for the purposes of a historical reappraisal of 
modern law, from the standpoint of resistance and struggle, is the description of 
revolutionary constitutionalism in 18
th
 century America by St. George Tucker in the 
appendix to his 1803 edition of Blackstone‟s Commentaries.19 Third, it would be an 
error to recognize the importance of the Bolivian indigenous struggle against global 
capitalism, but to associate their political action against the paradigms of modern 
politics and knowledge with words like romantic, traditional, or indigenista.  
                
Let us conclude with a distinction between two competing understandings of 
sovereignty: First, the modern conception of sovereignty, associated from the very 
outset with the practice of flattening the world and eliminating „thick‟ practices. It 
relies upon something akin to the instruments of magic, a sort of sorcery that allows 
for the illusion that the process of expansion is infinite and totally self-referential, 
having in itself the cause of its own endless movement. 
From the very outset this machinery has combined optical illusion and mathematics 
(first geometry, nowadays economics) with forms of mimesis (theatrics, reproduction 
and representation) in an attempt to announce the coming catastrophe, in order to 
avert it, by representing it as the consequence of the deed done by some arch-enemy. 
The magical trick operates when, following the expulsion or sacrifice of the chosen 
enemy, the announced catastrophe remains a non-actualised possibility. In fact, this 
sleight of hand gives the machinery its own principle of movement; it becomes an 
automaton. 
 
The prime example of this machinery can be seen in the frontispiece of Thomas 
Hobbes‟ Leviathan. As Peter Fitzpatrick, Horst Bredekamp and Dario Gamboni have 
observed, the image should be understood in the context of 16
th
 and 17
th
 century 
controversies around the religious function and ontology of images, and the increased 
capacity to manipulate response by an „illusionistic‟ depiction of visual appearances. 
The latter implies a self-referential mode of representation, as seen for instance in 
composite portraiture. In the frontispiece, attributed to the engraver and theoretician 
of perspective Abraham Bosse, only the upper part of the personification is seen, with 
open arms and extended shadow suggesting movement forward. The scene 
corresponds to Chapter 17, § 13, on „the generation of the Leviathan‟. It is the 
moment when all men agree to give up their right of self-government to one man or 
one assembly authorized to act in their name, thereby becoming „united in one 
person‟, in order to avert the catastrophic results of the war „of every man, against 
every man‟.  
 
This representative unity can be a real person, and Hobbes combines the notion of a 
„compact‟ with that of absolute power, since the authorization is irrevocable and 
unlimited: „And he that carrieth this person, is called SOVEREIGN, and said to have 
sovereign power; and everyone besides, his SUBJECT.‟ The key proposition here is 
that one can be equal to many. This proposition effectively silences, in the name of 
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order and reason, in the name of averting catastrophe, the alleged irrationality of the 
people gathered around their powerful visions and objects.  
 
It is also a recipe for sacrifice and the elimination of „residual‟ practices. Insofar as it 
is preventive and, as such, a form of risk-management; it is profoundly nihilistic in 
that it either accepts the necessity of or actively seeks to eliminate every practice that 
cannot be aligned with a certain (sovereign) definition of the future. The form of 
immanent sovereignty that has been one of the subjects of this paper partake on this 
proposition: it sacrifices visions, objects and individuals to some maximizing function 
directed towards the future of humanity; a future that is, paradoxically, non-real but 
always/already merely possible. Thus, objects and individuals count only as ciphers of 
a (suffering, destructive but creative) humanity, pieces of engineering that can be 
modified at will. Put otherwise, they do not matter and are effectively de-materialised.   
 
This proposition of sovereignty must be opposed to a second proposition according to 
which „one‟ and „many‟ are not interchangeable. But the focus here is not on the old 
question „the One or the Many?‟ Such dilemma expresses, as it often occurs with this 
sort of choices, the empirical-transcendent power attributed to restricted abstraction. 
The point is not to choose between these set options, but to escape the given set of 
options. The latter is the position of revolt, fidelity before the threshold of another 
world that can be, as exemplified in the ancient story of Orestes or in the 
contemporary struggle of Bolivia‟s indigenous. It is also the basis for a renewed form 
of materialism, in which elements are powerful enough to escape all relational 
totalities of the kind that results in complete subsumption. From that position, political 
struggle is not about the clash of contradictory practices, which invariably results in 
the complete subsumption of one of the parties, but rather, about the linking together 
of divergent practices into a collective ( sociality and the common).  
 
This gathering cannot take place on the basis of some common name or ground 
(humanity, the multitude as fountainhead of creativity, and so on) but rather, through 
the gathering power of the call of justice and the dialectical image, of sounds and 
common visions. The point is to make these objects, their places, and their associated 
practices, matter. This is a plea for a more relevant form of political composition, 
materialist and non-eliminativist, and since music and the visual arts are also forms of 
composition in which what matters are the powerful objects and their associated 
practices, let me finish by opposing an image of the South to the powerful image of 
Leviathan. 
 
This image comes from a political tract written in 1616 by an early Peruvian critic 
named Waman Puma (titled Nueva Corónica y Buen Gobierno) addressed to King 
Felipe II of Spain. In this tract the visual part is no less important that the written one 
(written in a double language: Quechua and Spanish). It mobilises, visually, a 
conception of objects and space organized into a fourfold. I do not have time to 
develop here the importance of this notion in ontology; it would suffice to remember 
Aristotle‟s four-sided account of causation, and also that „the fourfold‟ is precisely 
one of the strangest and most important conceptualisations of post-Heideggerian 
ontology. It refers to an infinity with closure, as opposed to the infinity of the merely 
possible. It implies a more relevant metaphysics of time and space (loops, virtuous 
circles) and a principle of collective self-organization. This political tract should be 
read together with those written by former Afro-Caribbean slaves, for instance, by 
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people like Olaudah Equiano (The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah 
Equiano, 1790) and Quobna Ottabah Cugoano (Thoughts and Sentiments on the Evil 
of Slavery, 1787). Put together, these works form a trans-modern and trans-national 
genealogy of anti-sovereign and materialist thought that is more relevant for the 
purposes of today‟s struggle. 
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1
 On Fanon‟s „principle of exclusivity‟, see Cornell (2008: 105-6). On the ethics of mimesis, sense and 
sensibility, particularly on the work of Adam Smith and Francis Hutcheson, see Eagleton (2009: 12-
83). On the connection between such an ethics and colonial hegemony see Eagleton (2009: 62-82). On 
„the collapse of the ethical‟ brought about by colonialism, see Cornell (2008: 105-9) and Gordon 
(2000: 35). On the link between such ethics and sovereignty in liberalism, see Dupuy (1992  
2
 For my use of the term „ideology‟, see Geuss, 2008: 50-5. 
3
 On the task of the sovereign as katēchon or „restrainer‟, and its link with the „myth‟ that conceives of 
the political as determined by the management and limitation of violence, see Kirwan, 2008: 23-25. For 
the connections between this political myth and the work of Hobbes and Carl Schmitt, see Kirwan, 
2008: 25-29, based on the work of Jürgen Moltmann and Liberation Theology, and for the link between 
the doctrin of the katēchon, law as nomos, and the fixity of territory or the division of the world along 
„global lines, see pp. 29-33. On „global lines‟, see also De Sousa Santos, 2007. Michael Kirwan, 
speaking from the standpoint of political theology against what he qualifies as „political mythology‟, 
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makes the interesting point that some see Schmitt‟s project as a thoroughly „immanent project with no 
trace of the transcendence of Christian faith‟, while others see it as „more polemical and 
“dramaturgical” than substantive‟ (2008: 31). This essay takes seriously the qualification of Schmitt‟s 
theory of sovereignty (and his conception of faithfulness) as „dramaturgical‟ or theatrical –blending 
aspects of the legacy of Greek tragedy with the Baroque drama of the conquista and the rise of the 
modern/colonial/capitalist world system.  The point is that in the shadowy background of Schmitt‟s 
theory of sovereignty one should see the unfinished project of decolonisation. Put otherwise, to the 
mythical view of the world as divided and settled along global lines, this essay will oppose „the view 
from below‟ as understood through the work of Walter Benjamin, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, 
Augusto Boal‟s „theatre of the oppressed‟, Lewis Gordon‟s reworking of Phenomenology through 
Fanon and Sartre (in relation to the so-called MCD perspective) and its linking with the tradition of 
Critical Theory via the work of Drucilla Cornell and Eduardo Mendieta. For my use of the term „myth‟ 
see Kirwan, 2008: 21 and Cornell, 2008: 137, the latter in relation to Benjamin‟s use of the term 
Erfahrung.   
4
   See on this my book Being Against the World: Rebellion and Constitution (2009). See also Ira Levy 
(2006: 307-335), Blackburn (2008: 128-135), and Žižek (2006: 50-67). For precedents in U. S. law see, 
Pickering v. Cease, Ill. 328 (1875), Pixley v. Boynton 79, Ill. 351, the opinion of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court in Barnard v. Blackhaus, Wisc. 53  (1881), and Irwin v. Willar. 
5
 The modernity/coloniality/decoloniality perspective is interested „not only in alternative worlds and 
knowledges‟ arising „from the epistemic borders of the modern-colonial world system‟ but also „in 
worlds and knowledges otherwise‟ (Escobar, 2008: 12) that is to say, not just in the alternatives that 
might exist within the realm of the possible but also in expanding the realm of the possible itself. Its 
chief ontological/epistemological category is not „the possible‟ but rather „the improbable‟ and 
radically new.   
6
 This is a reference to the notion of „catastrophic equilibrium‟ developed upon Gramscian grounds, 
with a nod to complexity theory, by sociologist Alvaro García-Linera in the context of an analysis of 
the transformations of sovereignty brought about by the rise of the socio-political movement known as 
MAS-IPSP in Bolivia. See on this García-Linera,  2007. 
7
 This paraphrases Jane Gordon‟s understanding of „creolization‟ and trans-culturation, building also on 
the work of Fernández-Retamar (2005) and de Sousa Santos (1998, 2007). See Gordon (2006: 5) and 
Cornell, who cites her (2008: 133). 
8
 See on this Foucault, 2002: 365 ff., Duffield, 2007: 1-31, and Cornell, 2008: 39-74. 
9
 See also Guardiola-Rivera, 2009: 242-257, Miller, 2008: 6-71 a7 53, and Badiou, 2008: 73-85..       
10
 The quote continues: „And, yet, we know that millions upon millions of people in the twentieth 
century alone showed the falsity of such characterizations of fated nature by giving their lives for the 
fight for socialism. South Africa has become both a symbol and an allegory for many in the world 
today because the victorious struggle against apartheid ultimately took place in negotiations rather than 
through armed revolution that would have led to some system of government and law capitulating to 
the other in annihilation. (…) But the negotiations of course were only made feasible by wave after 
wave of rebellion and resistance as each next generation took on its own struggle against apartheid long 
after the leaders of the ANC were in jail and the Party in exile. Certainly, the ANC has wavered in its 
commitment, and some critics would argue capitulated to the demands of advanced capitalism. But, 
Benjamin and Derrida are suggesting to us that there is no end to what South Africa can become 
because of some metanarrative that dooms it in advance‟ (Cornell, 2008: 148).  
11
 The reference here is to the question posited by Lenin „what is to be done?‟, and to its answer, 
posited by social theorist Boaventura de Sousa Santos in the following terms: „What is to be done, 
then? The only route, it seems to me, is utopia. By utopia I mean the exploration by imagination of 
new modes of human possibility and styles of will, and the confrontation by imagination of the 
necessity of whatever exists – just because it exists – on behalf of something radically better that is 
worth fighting for, and to which humanity is fully entitled.‟ See Boaventura de Sousa Santos 
1995:479 (emphasis mine). It is worth clarifying that the opposition proposed here is not intended 
as a simple binary, but rather, as complex co-existence in tension. The argument is largely but not 
solely drawn from Santos (1995; 2007), concerning modernity and emancipation, and from a 
certain reading of the term „responsibility‟ inspired by Ellacuría, Zubiri, Levinas, and others, in 
relation to the philosophical „problem of communication‟. See on this Guardiola-Rivera, 2009: 133-
41. See also Waterman, 2001. 
12
 See on this Guardiola-Rivera, 2009: 148-152. 
13
 Here, we are reminded of the distinction that black philosophers of existence make between „choice‟ 
and „option‟. There is a sense in which we always are in the process of choosing and we are responsible 
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for our choices. But, „to make it clear that not all of us are able to choose equally in the sense of having 
the same sphere of options, black philosophers of existence, particularly Lewis Gordon, insist that the 
struggle is itself meant to open up options that were never before available and, in the space so opened, 
create the ability to reflect on how our seeming choices were formerly the result of having no other 
option‟ (Cornell, 2008: 123, in reference to Gordon, 1995: 79, Sylvia Wynter and Franz Fanon).  
14
 See on this Guardiola-Rivera, 2009: 220-22. 
15
 For an account of virtual or counterfactual choice vis-à-vis the „risk‟ structure of the law issued by 
today‟s sovereign, see „Law, Radical Choice & Rock „n Roll‟, in Guardiola-Rivera, 2009: 228-234.  
16
 The reference is to an anecdote according to which economist Milton Friedman produced a pencil in 
order to demonstrate the power of capitalism to bring together materials from all corners of the world, 
to compose them, flattening them into a commodity-object. The anecdote is taken up by Thomas L. 
Friedman (no relation) in his book The World is Flat: A Brief History of the 20
th
 Century. New York: 
Penguin, 2005.  
17
 See on this Fernández Retamar, 2005: 7. 
18
 For the development of such arguments, see Jonas, 1985; Dupuy, 2005; and Stiegler, 2001. 
19
 See St. George Tucker, 1999 [1803]. 
